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Abstract 
In 2014, the government of New Brunswick implemented a new royalty regime for 
natural gas in the context of their regulatory review of shale gas. Advocates of shale gas 
stressed the additional government revenues that would result. However, the 
government provided no background documentation to explain their methodology or 
substantiate their claims. This study provides such estimates, utilizing a methodology 
that incorporates the intricacies of the New Brunswick system and assumptions drawn 
from economic and productivity analysis of the North American shale gas industry. Our 
study challenges previous revenue estimates and provides a transparent methodology to 
inform public policy. 
Résumé 
En 2014, le gouvernement du Nouveau Brunswick a mis en oeuvre un nouveau régime de 
redevances pour le gaz naturel dans le cadre de son examen réglementaire du gaz de 
schiste. Des défenseurs du gaz de schiste ont souligné les recettes publiques 
supplémentaires qui en résulteraient. Toutefois, le gouvernement n’a pas fourni de 
documentation de référence pour expliquer sa méthodologie ou étayer ses affirmations. 
La présente étude fournit de telles estimations, grâce à une méthodologie qui tient compte 
des complexités du système du Nouveau Brunswick et des hypothèses établies à partir de 
l’analyse de l’économie et de la productivité de l’industrie nord-américaine du gaz de 
schiste. Notre étude remet en question les dernières estimations des recettes et présente 
une méthodologie transparente permettant d’orienter les politiques publiques. 
Introduction 
The extraction of natural gas from shale using techniques of hydraulic fracturing (fracking) 
currently takes place in several jurisdictions in the United States and Canada, notably in British 
Columbia and Alberta. At the same time, several political jurisdictions have imposed moratoriums on 
fracking, including the state of New York and the Canadian provinces of Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New 
Brunswick. In these cases, there was a process of public engagement, supported by analytical research of 
the economic, social, environmental, and public health implications of fracking, varying in the depth of 
the analysis and the transparency of their proceedings. Part of the economic research was concerned 
with the revenue implications of alternative systems of royalties. 
In the case of New Brunswick, a re-evaluation of the natural gas royalty system was initiated by 
the New Brunswick Department of Finance in 2011. This continued during the public shale gas 
consultation process and culminated with the introduction of legislation in 2014, which replaced the 
previous 10% natural gas royalty with a more complex economic rent royalty1 that varied with the 
profitability of the businesses. The government consistently argued that the new system would increase 
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revenues to the province. For example, the government’s natural gas group suggested in 2012 that 
natural gas royalties could yield $2.2 billion per year within twenty years (“Sharing of Royalties” 7), an 
amount greater than the $1.5 billion in equalization payments received from the federal government. 
More recently, the February 2016 report of the New Brunswick Commission on Hydraulic Fracturing 
provided illustrations with annual natural gas royalty revenues between $400 and $600 million annually 
within twenty years (28). The variations in the estimates were, however, difficult to explain given the 
lack of transparency regarding the methodologies employed. 
The principal objective of this paper is to provide a publicly accessible model for estimating 
New Brunswick royalties from shale gas. To that end, the spreadsheets containing the complete models 
are available on the website of the Journal of New Brunswick Studies and readers are encouraged to 
provide their comments to the authors.  
As context, we begin with a brief description of provincial natural gas royalty systems in 
Canada, identifying the distinctive aspects of the New Brunswick system. We summarize the historical 
origins of the current New Brunswick system, followed by a detailed description of how the royalties are 
calculated. We then explain the methodology we have used to estimate shale gas royalties under four 
alternative scenarios and provide our quantitative estimates of the potential revenues that could be 
generated by the new system compared with the old system in those scenarios. The final section of the 
paper summarizes our conclusions.  
The Canadian Context 
In most provinces, royalty systems for shale gas developed as modifications of conventional 
natural gas royalty systems. Table 1 summarizes these conventional provincial royalty systems which, 
with some variations, increase their royalty rates when the price of natural gas and/or the productivity of 
the particular well increase. They differ in the degree to which royalty rates change with changes in 
market prices and well productivity, and the extent to which they use developmental incentives to reduce 
royalty rates. For example, the basic rates in Alberta and Saskatchewan vary with productivity while 
those in British Columbia do not, except for special programs that provide royalty reductions for 
especially unproductive wells. 
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Table 1. Provincial Natural Gas Royalty Regimes, as of December 2015 
Province Nominal Royalty Rates1 
Rates Vary with Market 
Price or Well 
Productivity? 
Special Programs? 
British Columbia2 9% to 27% Market price Numerous special royalty credits 
Alberta3 5% to 36% Both price and productivity 
Reduced royalty rates for new 
wells, deep wells 
Saskatchewan4 0% to 35% Both price and productivity 
Temporary special rates for 
horizontal gas wells 





a. 10% to 12.5%
b. 5% to 35%
a. Varied with well
productivity
b. Vary with price and
well productivity
a. Tax credit of 15% of
exploration costs
b. Non-refundable royalty
credit of 15% of
exploration costs





b. Basic royalty component
is the maximum of:
1) 2% tax on monthly
gross revenues
2) 4% tax on average
wellhead price ×
monthly production.
Economic rent royalty 
calculated as 25% of net cash 
flow. 




affect tax base of
economic rent royalty.
a. No
b. Cost of basic royalty is
included as a cost in
calculating the cash flow
base of the economic rent
royalty.
Unused cost deductions 
carried forward with interest 
equal to nominal long rate on 
government of Canada bonds. 
1 Nominal rates can differ significantly from effective rates because of deductions of some costs from revenues 
before the tax is calculated. 
Sources: 
2 Alberta “Oil and Gas Fiscal Regimes.” 
3 Alberta “Oil and Gas Fiscal Regimes.” 
4 Alberta “Oil and Gas Fiscal Regimes,” Saskatchewan “Natural Gas,” and Saskatchewan “Royalty/Tax Incentive 
after October 1, 2002.” 
5 Alberta “Oil and Gas Fiscal Regimes.” 
6 Quebec “Fair and Competitive Royalty System.” 
7 Atherton et al. “Report of the Nova Scotia Independent Review Panel on Hydraulic Fracturing.” 
8 New Brunswick “Assessment” and New Brunswick Natural Gas Group “Royalties.” 
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In recent years, the major natural gas producing provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and British 
Columbia have introduced incentives for shale gas exploitation, driven primarily by tax competition and 
the desire to accelerate the speed of development, especially in remote areas. With a few exceptions (due 
primarily to the nature of the particular shale deposits), British Columbia and Alberta have royalty 
systems for shale gas that are similar in terms of royalty rates and incentives for development of 
similarly situated reserves. Our focus here is on the royalty systems and not the revenue generated from 
auctions of exploration rights (bonus bids), which are significant in the western provinces but are not 
used in New Brunswick. 
Historical Overview of New Brunswick’s Natural Gas Royalty Regime 
Between 2011 and 2014, the government of New Brunswick carried out an internal review of the 
natural gas royalty regime, as part of a more general review of royalties for natural gas, oil, potash, and 
minerals. A cornerstone of that review was the conceptual difference between royalties calculated as a 
percentage of the selling price and royalties designed to capture the economic rent associated with the 
resource. In the past, royalty payments in New Brunswick were viewed as payment by the private sector 
for the transfer of ownership of a public resource. No attempt was made to account for the profits or the 
losses that businesses might experience when extracting the resource. As Table 1 indicates, New 
Brunswick’s royalty was historically 10% of the wellhead selling price, in contrast with Alberta where 
royalties could be as high as 36% of revenues, depending on the selling price and the productivities of 
individual wells. 
From the economic rent perspective, royalties could capture for the public all “excess profits” 
(i.e., economic rent or profits in excess of some normal rate of return) that firms might receive from high 
resource prices or the low production costs that could result from unusually productive gas wells. 
Moreover, economic rent-based royalties require that the public sector share the risks of losses from low 
resource prices or high production costs. From this perspective, economic rents could be taxed up to 
100% without changing the behaviour of firms. This is so because, by definition, economic rent is a rate 
of return above and beyond that which is required to induce a firm to undertake a particular investment. 
In July 2011 the Department of Finance contracted with a private consultant to conduct a 
theoretical analysis of royalty structures and “propose a royalty structure for oil and gas (including 
natural gas)…that optimizes the value of resources to New Brunswick in a manner that does not 
interfere with investment” (New Brunswick “Contract” 4). The report, “An Assessment of Royalty 
Policy in New Brunswick” (hereafter, “Assessment”), recommended a shift to an economic rent royalty 
system, a recommendation that became the basis for the shale gas royalty system. Specifically, the 
consultant recommended a rent-based royalty of 25% (of net cash flow) with a minimum 4% tax on 
revenues from sales. Current and capital costs were to be fully deducted from revenues in calculating net 
cash flow; any unused deductions could be carried forward, and minimum royalty payments were to be 
fully credited against the cash flow tax. The consultant’s recommendations were informed by the 
theoretical advantages of economic rent royalties and recent experience with rent-based royalties for 
unconventional oil production in Alberta and internationally (New Brunswick “Assessment” 7). The 
consultant did not estimate the revenue impacts of the proposed royalty regime. 
In May 2012, the New Brunswick government announced their public-input process (chaired by 
Louis LaPierre) for June and provided the public with two documents: “Responsible Environmental 
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Management of Oil and Gas Activities in New Brunswick: Recommendations for Public Discussion” 
and “Responsible Environmental Management of Oil and Gas Activities in New Brunswick: Sharing of 
Royalty Revenues from Natural Gas Activities in New Brunswick” (New Brunswick Natural Gas 
Group). The documents recommended continuation of the historical royalty of 10% of natural gas 
revenues in addition to a new 40% economic rent royalty calculated using the same methodology as in 
the consultant’s report (New Brunswick “Assessment”). Of special note is that the proposed royalty 
regime would not follow the “ring fence” approach of western Canadian provinces; that is, in New 
Brunswick, shale gas companies could deduct expenses from all of their provincial operations (all wells) 
against their province-wide net cash flow before paying their economic rent royalty. 
In October 2012, LaPierre released his report, The Path Forward, which did not comment on the 
proposed royalty system. In May 2013, the New Brunswick government released “The New Brunswick 
Oil and Gas Blueprint,” which provided no additional information related to their proposed royalty 
system. It mentioned that it was continuing to review revenue sharing, and indicated that it was also 
continuing with stakeholder consultations. In April 2014, the New Brunswick government implemented 
the new natural gas royalty, combining a minimum percentage royalty on sales revenues (between 2% 
and 4%) with a 25% economic rent royalty. No background studies were provided to justify the tax rates 
or to estimate the expected revenues compared with the previous system. 
Comparing the Royalty Regimes 
The economic criteria applied to any tax or royalty include the implications for economic 
efficiency, equity, costs of administration, tax transparency, and the reliability of the revenue stream 
(Boadway and Wildasin 225). On efficiency grounds, taxes on economic rents are considered superior to 
other revenue sources, given their limited impact on private decision-making under competitive market 
conditions, even when economic rents are taxed at up to 100%.2 However, there is less consensus about 
the other criteria. From the equity perspective, the issues relate to the distribution of the costs and 
benefits of resource exploitation for both current and future generations, their methods of estimation, 
and how the distribution compares to other taxes. Administration of an economic rent royalty will 
require costly auditing of the financial records of each firm’s operations within the province; such 
auditing would not be required with a simpler revenue tax. Additionally, tax transparency is limited by 
the lack of access by the public to corporate proprietary financial information, which is at the core of the 
royalty calculations. While all of these issues are important in the choice of royalty regime, we confine 
ourselves in this paper to the analysis of one economic aspect of the shale gas royalty system in New 
Brunswick: the reliability of the revenue stream, specifically the size and timing of the royalty revenues 
that New Brunswick might expect from the current royalty system in comparison to the old system. 
The Current Natural Gas Royalty Regime in New Brunswick 
The new regulations for the New Brunswick royalty regime specify that royalty payments consist 
of a “basic royalty” component and an “economic rent” component calculated on a monthly basis. This 
basic royalty will be the maximum of (1) 4% of the wellhead price that month multiplied by the 
production of all wells, and (2) 2% of the monthly gross revenues from natural gas production. 
The wellhead price in (1) is the weighted average selling price for the month in Canadian dollars 
less (a) a per-unit gas processing allowance (described below) and (b) the per-unit transportation costs 
charged by a third party to move the gas from the processing facility to market. 
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The per-unit gas processing allowance, assuming processing is provided by the gas producer, is 
the sum of the following: 
1) the direct operating costs (DOC) related to the gathering, processing, and transportation of
the gas;
2) an overhead allowance set at 10% of DOC;
3) a depreciation allowance for those assets used in the gathering, processing, and transportation
of the natural gas; and
4) a 15% annual return on the average monthly undepreciated balance of capital assets involved
in (3).
The sum is then divided by total production from all of the lessee’s wells to get a per-unit cost. 
The regulations spell out the equation to be used for the economic rent royalty component: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 0.25 × [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 − (𝐸𝐸 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)] 
where 
CGR = cumulative gross revenues from all gas operations in New Brunswick during the 
year 
E = the sum of all capital expenditures and all operating costs, including the basic 
royalty component, but not including interest expenses, depreciation expenses, 
or corporate income taxes 
CF = a “carry-forward” amount equal to the values in E from previous periods that 
could not be deducted from current revenues (because ER cannot be negative). 
These unused deductions are “carried forward and an annual interest rate equal 
to the daily average Government of Canada Benchmark Bond Yield: Long Term 
Rate for the calendar year shall be applied to those expenditures and costs” 
(New Brunswick Regulation 11(11)). 
The Ring Fencing Issue 
A notable feature of the current New Brunswick system is that royalties are not calculated on a 
per well basis, as are all other natural gas royalty systems in Canada. The only system in Canada that 
resembles New Brunswick’s economic rent approach is the British Columbia net profit system for high-
cost shale gas wells in the Horn River area. In this case, individual projects are ring-fenced to limit the 
government’s risk. In the current New Brunswick system, on the other hand, economic profits are 
calculated on a provincial basis. As a result, if a firm drills wells that are generating an economic profit, 
it will be able to postpone paying the economic rent royalty if it can offset those profits with the costs of 
newly drilled wells or costs incurred from the shutdown of old wells. 
The Production and Revenue Simulation Model 
We constructed four scenarios based on alternative assumptions regarding average well 
productivity. Our cost of production assumptions are based on current costs of exploration, drilling, 
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fracking, operations, and natural gas transportation. We use the latest United States Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) reference case estimates3 for future natural gas prices and value the Canadian 
dollar based on purchasing power parity. All our cost and revenue estimates are measured in constant 
2016 dollars. 
An important long-run factor (and a factor with a great degree of uncertainty) is the productivity 
of the resource, the estimated ultimate recovery (EUR) of each well. The EUR is the cumulative amount 
of natural gas that could flow from a well (although in practice, the entire amount might not be 
recovered if low flows result in the shutting down of the well). Our base-case scenario is informed by 
the historical average EUR of the Marcellus Interior, the most productive area within the Marcellus 
region, which was estimated by the EIA to have an EUR of 1.589 Bcf (Billion cubic feet). This is 
significantly higher than the estimated average shale gas well in the United States, which had an EUR of 
about 1.17 Bcf (U.S. EIA “Annual Energy Outlook 2012” 58). Given that well productivities have 
increased over time with technological changes and the possibility of fracking the same well more than 
once, our base-case scenario assumes an EUR of 2.0. For our second scenario, we use the EUR assumed 
in the Wheeler Report (Atherton et al.), which is 2.5 Bcf. We have also introduced two high EUR 
scenarios of 3.0 and 3.5 Bcf, which, while substantially above the U.S. average, do occur in some 
regions in the United States. See Appendix 1 for details. 
We then use an Arps hyperbolic decline curve model4 to generate annual production from an 
individual well. Specifically, we assign values for the parameters in the Arps equation that lead to the 
assumed level of recoverable reserves while providing a reasonable time path for gas flows given 
experience elsewhere. In each case, we use parameters estimated by the EIA for gas wells in 
Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania. Given our assumption of identical decline parameters for all wells 
in a given scenario, the four EUR scenarios have representative wells with similar decline curves, 
varying primarily in yearly output.5 Production from the representative well in each scenario is then 
multiplied by the number of wells that were drilled in that year. Our scenarios are for a drilling rate of 
fifty wells per year. Results for other drilling rates can easily be found by scaling our estimates. 
Our simulations of natural gas production and the associated royalty revenues assume that the 
industry consists of a single firm. This reflects the incentive that companies would have to merge under 
the current economic rent royalty that applies to natural gas production. As noted earlier, the economic 
rent royalty allows for the carrying forward of any expenses that have not yet been used to offset 
revenues in the calculation of the royalty. A company whose operations have failed to cover their costs 
would have valuable unused credits that could be sold to a company with a potentially profitable 
operation. The two companies would merge and all of the carry-forward amounts would be used. If, 
across the industry as a whole, there were positive gains to be had (as measured by the provisions in the 
economic rent royalty), such a process could continue until there were only profit-making companies 
remaining. Their operations could effectively be considered as taking place in a single company. 
Each scenario is based on an EIA natural gas price scenario from 2017 to 2041. We use the EIA 
reference price scenario. These prices, in US$/BTU are converted to US$/Mcf (for compatibility with 
the production units).6 We use a purchasing power parity exchange rate of 1.23 (the average for the last 
ten years)7 for all scenarios. Data for field processing costs and pipeline transportation costs8 are then 
deducted from this gross price to get a “wellhead price” that is the basis for basic royalty calculations. 
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In each period, gross revenues are compared with the ongoing costs of operating the wells in that 
year. If the gross revenues would not cover the operating costs, including the basic royalty, the producer 
will shut the well down. This cost is a fixed, one-time amount. Because all wells are assumed to be 
identical and face the same conditions, wells of a given age either all remain operational or are all shut 
down. 
For the new royalty regime, base royalties are calculated based on the maximum of (a) 2% of 
gross revenue (using the market price and current rate of production) and (b) 4% of the value of the gas 
using the wellhead price described earlier. If the wells in question have shut down (based on the earlier 
calculation), zero royalties are collected. To calculate the revenues from the previous royalty regime, the 
2% gross revenue royalty is set to zero and the 4% rate is set to 10%. The economic rent royalty rate, 
described next, is then set to zero. 
The economic rent royalty requires a calculation of the net cash flow generated by wells of each 
vintage. The net cash flow in each period equals that period’s gross revenue minus costs, including basic 
royalties. The value for the first year of each well’s life consists of a single amount to cover all costs 
associated with the well before it can begin production. These costs are carried forward to the next year, 
with interest. For each subsequent year, net cash flow for that year is compared with the carry-forward 
amount. If the difference between the net cash flow in that year and the carry-forward amount is 
positive, then no more expenses are carried forward for those wells and an economic profit on those 
wells has appeared. Otherwise, the unused costs are carried forward. This continues year after year until 
either (a) the positive net cash flow in each year more than offsets the expenses being carried forward so 
that the cumulative net cash flow becomes positive; (b) twenty-five years is reached and the simulation 
stops; or (c) the well is shut down. 
This illustrates a crucial feature of the new royalty system noted earlier: it does not “ring fence” 
wells, so that expenses from some wells can be used to offset positive net cash flows from other wells. 
Only when cumulative net cash flows become positive across all existing wells does the firm pay the 
economic rent royalty. Thus, it is possible to have zero economic rent royalty being paid during the 
entire twenty-five year simulation period, yet many wells could at some point in their lives experience 
positive economic profits.  
Lastly, we calculate the yearly basic royalty revenues and economic rent revenues in each 
scenario and, applying a real social discount rate of 3%, estimate the present value for each of the 
royalty revenue streams over the twenty-five-year time horizon. 
Scenarios and Discussion 
In Table 2, we summarize our findings for the four scenarios. There are three main points of 
interest. First, the royalty revenues are highly sensitive to the EUR. Given an EUR of 2.0 Bcf (slightly 
higher than the historical Marcellus experience), the old system yields 32% more present value revenue 
than the new system. With a higher EUR of 2.5 Bcf, the new system yields 15% more revenue. With the 
higher EURs of 3.0 and 3.5 Bcf, the new system yields, respectively, 46% and 69% more revenue than 
the old system. Second, the impact of the current royalty system on provincial revenues is relatively 
small in the context of an $8 billion provincial budget. For example, in the EUR 2.5 scenario, it is ten 
years before there is a net cash flow for purposes of calculating the economic rent portion, and annual 
revenues are less than $35 million during the first nine years. It is only in the high EUR cases where 
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revenues are high enough to have significant impacts on provincial finances. Third, our scenarios 
suggest that it is unclear whether the royalty system introduced in 2014 will yield higher revenues than 
the previous system. That will depend on the average EUR of wells, which is uncertain. Fourth, the 
scenarios demonstrate that all projections are very sensitive to the choice of assumptions. We have based 
our scenarios on alternative assumptions about the productivity of the resource, as it has a great deal of 
uncertainty. Our other assumptions are given with the detailed spreadsheets (available at the JNBS 
website) and the specific cost assumptions are described in Appendix 3. 
Table 2. Four Scenarios: Present Value of 25-year Royalty Revenues (millions of 2016 dollars) 












(Marcellus) $1181 $807 −32% $47 $32 
2.5 
(Wheeler) $1482 $1697 +15% $59 $68 
3.0  $1780 $2597 +46% $71 $104 
3.5  $2080 $3507 +69% $83 $140 
Source: Authors’ simulations, available at JNBS website. 
All royalty systems based on economic rent, as opposed to a fixed percent of revenue, involve 
the government sharing more of the risk associated with the uncertainty of future well productivity. This 
is demonstrated in Figure 1, which illustrates how the new royalty system gives up revenues in the early 
years in expectation of higher royalty revenues in later years. In this case (EUR 2.0), it is not until the 
nineteenth year that the new system generates revenues greater than the previous system. Further, the 
higher revenues in later years would not compensate for the lost revenues in the early years. Should the 
average EUR prove to be significantly higher, then the converse would apply. This is demonstrated by 
the relatively higher discounted present value of the revenue stream of the new royalty system when the 
average EUR is 2.5 or higher. If the productivity of the average well is higher, then the new system will 
generate relatively higher revenues. 




The decision about whether or not to produce natural gas by fracking requires consideration of 
its social, environmental, public health, and economic consequences. One component of the economic 
consequences is the effect on government royalties paid by corporations for the privilege of exploiting 
the publicly owned resource. 
The objective of this research was to develop a publicly available model to evaluate the revenue 
claims associated with the new natural gas royalty system introduced in New Brunswick in 2014. In the 
process, we have drawn attention to some of the economic aspects of the royalty system. These include 
the considerable uncertainty associated with any revenue projections and the general risk sharing (with 
private developers) that the province has taken by including a tax on economic rent as an important 
component of the new system. We have focused on one area with a great degree of uncertainty—the 
productivity of the shale resource and its relation to royalty revenues. 
We have concluded that the new royalty regime could produce more revenues than the old 
regime on a present value basis only if well productivities are relatively high. Additionally, the time 
profiles of revenues differ significantly between the old and new systems. The old royalty regime 
produces relatively more revenues in the early years of development, while the new regime postpones 
revenues in the hope that economic rents will materialize to be taxed in the future. As a result, shale gas 
royalties under the new regime would not make a significant contribution to the province’s finances in 
the early years of development, and would only do so in the longer term with high well productivities. In 
the future, if New Brunswick decides to open the shale gas moratorium for public discussion, our model 
may be of assistance in providing the public with an understanding of the royalties which shale gas may, 

















Figure 1. Two Royalty Regimes Compared (EUR 2.0)
10% Royalty
NB Current System
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Endnotes
 
1 More precisely, the NB system is a combination of a resource rent tax and an ad valorem royalty. We 
have chosen to name it an “economic rent royalty” to highlight the underlying economic theory. 
2 Some economists suggest a rate of up to 100% (Boadway and Flatters 36), while others make a case 
for some lesser amount (Busby et al. 23). 
3 See United States EIA “Assumptions” Figure 6 (average Henry Hub spot prices for natural gas in four 
cases, 2005–40). 
4 The Arps decline curve model is a widely used petroleum engineering technique used to model the 
lifetime production of a well. See Appendix 2. 
5 The technical appendix, available at the JNBS website, provides a complete profile of yearly output for 
each of the four scenarios. 
6 We multiplied prices by 1.022, the number of millions of BTUs in 1000 cubic feet of natural gas (U.S. 
EIA “Annual Energy Outlook 2015” Appendix G, 239). 
7 Calculated from OECD “PPPs and Exchange Rates.” 
8 See Appendix 3 for a discussion of these and other cost assumptions. 
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Appendix 1 
Table A1. United States Energy Information Administration 2014 Estimates of Estimated Ultimate 
Recovery (EUR) per Well and Well Spacing for Selected Shale Gas Plays in the United Statesa 
Basin/Play Well Spacing (wells/mi2) Average per Well Technically Recoverable Resources (Tcf) 
Appalachian    
Marcellus Interior 4.3 1.589 113.9 
Marcellus Foldbelt 4.3 0.315 1.2 
Utica Gas Zone Core 4.3 0.602 29.3 
Tuscarora 8.0 2.172 4.4 
Arkoma    
Woodford-Arkoma 8.0 1.422 6.7 
Fayetteville-Central 8.0 1.444 24.6 
TX-LA-MS Salt    
Cotton Valley 12.0 1.472 152.7 
Haynesville-Bossier-LA 6.0 3.709 42.2 
Haynesville-Bossier-LA 6.0 3.138 28.7 
Western Gulf    
Eagle Ford–Dry Zone 6.0 1.786 23.3 
Pearsall 6.0 1.090 7.8 
Anadarko    
Cana Woodford–Dry Zone 4.0 1.309 4.0 
Source: U.S. EIA “Assumptions” 133–4. 
a. The regions described within each basin are typically narrower than those in the play itself. In all 
cases, only the most productive areas within each basin are included here, although the Marcellus 
Foldbelt is shown here to illustrate the difference between the Marcellus itself and the more productive 
region within it that we have used in our simulation. EUR estimates also change significantly over time. 
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Appendix 2 
The Arps Hyperbolic Decline Curve 
One widely used approach to modelling the flow of gas from a well is the Arps decline curve model, 
which originated with Arps (“Analysis of Decline Curves,” “Estimation of Primary Reserves”). As Lee 
and Sidle explain, most available methodologies for forecasting production of tight gas and shale gas result 
in significant uncertainties because of complications arising from the geological properties of the reserves. 
It is important to note that we are not using the model to estimate reserves, where the 
uncertainties just noted are relevant. Instead, we use parameters for the Arps model to create a plausible 
account of a flow of gas that ultimately yields the amount of recoverable reserves that we have assumed 
for that simulation. Compared with the approach adopted in the Wheeler Report (Atherton et al.), the 
Arps decline curve typically offers a production scenario with a longer production life that is compatible 
with the same overall assumption about what will ultimately be extracted from the well. While this 
assumption of a slower production rate postpones some revenue receipts, the future production also 
fetches a higher price. 







where q(t) is the production rate at time t, qi is the initial production rate, Di is the initial nominal 
decline rate, t is time, and b is the hyperbolic exponent which describes the degree of curvature of the 
line. The b value can be adjusted to alter the time units: bannually = 12bmonthly = 365bdaily (Guo, Lyons, 
and Ghalambor). 
This is an empirical model, where qi, Di, and the b value are, in principle, determined by estimating 
best fit values based upon historical data of well production. The cumulative production function is: 




Given the form of the Arps decline curve, this becomes: 
𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡) =  
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(𝑏𝑏 − 1)
 [𝑞𝑞(𝑡𝑡)(1−𝑏𝑏) − 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
(1−𝑏𝑏)] 












Pipeline Transportation Costs 
Gardner and Hayes explain that 
Natural gas prices elsewhere in the U.S. are based on the pipeline differentials from 
Henry Hub. The price differential on the pipeline system supplying the U.S. Northeast 
(New England) has been in the $2.50/Mcf range in the last year or so, so this amount is 
added to the Henry Hub price to arrive at the so-called City Gate price of Massachusetts 
(a proxy for New England, a major market for Nova Scotia gas). To simplify the analysis, 
this differential is held constant over the projection period. The differential could change 
over time in response to additions to pipeline capacity and changes in natural gas demand 
and supply in the region. (117) 
If the natural gas produced in the Maritimes is exported to the United States, the wellhead price in New 
Brunswick would be the New England price less the transportation cost between New Brunswick and 
New England. According to Gardner and Hayes, the tariff on the American segment of the Maritime and 
Northeast Pipeline is US$0.54/Mcf, and C$0.805 is the charge on the Canadian section. We deduct these 
values from the New England price, adjusting the American dollar cost in accordance with our exchange 
rate assumptions, to get an estimate of the market price producers would face in New Brunswick. 
Exploration, Drilling and Extraction and Well Abandonment Costs 
The Deloitte Report, prepared for the Business Council of New Brunswick, sets out a rough 
estimate of development costs per well by phase of development and by type of expenditure (20–22). In 
their contribution to the Wheeler Report, Gardner and Hayes (111, Table 3.1) set out a separate set of 
assumptions about costs. 
The overall cost estimates are broadly similar: the Deloitte cost estimate for fifty wells is $663 
million, somewhat above the high end of the values in Gardner and Hayes. However, we have adopted 
the Gardner and Hayes estimates because they are more detailed: they include the costs of an exploration 
well and are explicit about the number of wells/well pad (this is significant, as costs per well are lowered 
by having more wells on each pad). Table A2 summarizes the costs we have assumed for each set of 
fifty wells in our simulation. These costs are used in the net cash flow calculations needed for the 
economic rent royalty. 
Immediately relevant for the royalties are costs of gathering and processing the gas, which are 
deducted from the market value of the gas in collecting the basic royalty. Gardner and Hayes assume 
that these “field processing costs” decline steadily from $1/Mcf to $0.70/Mcf over the twenty-five years 
that we are examining (119; see column 8 of Table 3.3). We also use these values. 
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Table A2. Summary of Cost Assumptions 
 Costs (2014 Canadian Dollars) Source Remarks 
All costs before 
production begins $560,000,000 
Average of high and low 
values from “assessing 
resource potential” through to 
“development” in Gardner 
and Hayes (111; Table 3.1) 
For a set of 50 wells, 5 wells 
per well pad; all costs 
assumed incurred in one year 
just before production begins 
Annual production costs $5,500,000 
Average of high and low 
values from Gardner and 
Hayes (111; Table 3.1) 
For 50 wells 
Abandonment costs $9,000,000 
Average of high and low 
values from Gardner and 
Hayes (111; Table 3.1) 
Only applicable if annual 
production revenues are less 
than annual production costs 
Source: Authors’ selection of estimates based on Gardner and Hayes. 
 
